Hospital Consolidation: The Rise of Geographically Distant Mergers.

This Viewpoint discusses how and why cross-market hospital mergers are different than prototypical within-market mergers in their effects on patients and communities, why the trend may be accelerating, and future policy and research directions.

The economic and public health impact of intellectual property licensing of medicines for low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study.

BACKGROUND: Non-exclusive voluntary licensing that is access-oriented has been suggested as an option to increase access to medicines to address the COVID-19 pandemic. To date, there has been little research on the effect of licensing, mainly focused on economic and supply chain considerations, and not on the benefits in terms of health outcomes. We aimed to study the economic and health effect of voluntary licensing for medicines for HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV) in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). METHODS: A robust modelling framework was created to examine the difference between scenarios, with (factual) and without (counterfactual) a Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) licence for two medicines, dolutegravir and daclatasvir. Data were obtained from MPP licensees, as well as a large number of external sources. The primary outcomes were the cost savings and health impact between scenarios with and without MPP licences across all LMICs. Through its licences, MPP had access to the volumes and prices of licensed generic products sold in all covered countries on a quarterly basis. These data informed the volumes, prices, and uptake for the past factual scenarios and were the basis for modelling the future factual scenarios. These scenarios were then compared with a set of counterfactual scenarios in the absence of the studied licences. FINDINGS: Cumulatively, between 2017 and 2032, the model's central assumptions predicted an additional uptake of 15·494 (range 14·406-15·494) million patient-years of dolutegravir-based HIV treatments, 151 839 (34 575-312 973) deaths averted, and US$3·074 (1·837-5·617) billion saved through the MPP licence compared with the counterfactual scenario. For daclatasvir-based HCV treatments, the cumulative effect from 2015 to 2026 was predicted to be an additional uptake of 428 244 (127 584-636 270) patients treated with daclatasvir, 4070 (225-6323) deaths averted, and $107·593 (30·377-121·284) million saved with the licence compared with the counterfactual scenario. INTERPRETATION: The chain of effects linking upstream licensing to downstream outcomes can be modelled. Accordingly, credible quantitative estimates of economic and health effects arising from access-oriented voluntary licensing were obtained based on assumptions that early generic competition leads to price reductions that influence procurement decisions and enable the faster and broader uptake of recommended medicines, with beneficial economic and health effects. FUNDING: Unitaid.

Being vulnerable.

Early-career researchers feel discouraged from exposing vulnerability even during a global crisis.

How Should the World Pay for a Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Vaccine?

The potential health and economic value of a vaccine for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is self-evident given nearly 2 million deaths, "collateral" loss of life as other conditions go untreated, and massive economic damage. Results from the first licensed products are very encouraging; however, there are important reasons why we will likely need second and third generation vaccines. Dedicated incentives and funding focused explicitly on nurturing and advancing competing second and third generation vaccines are essential. This article proposes a collaborative, market-based financing mechanism for the world to incentivize and pay for the development of, and provide equitable access to, second and third generation COVID-19 vaccines. Specifically, we propose consideration of a Benefit-Based Advance Market Commitment (BBAMC). The BBAMC uses health technology assessment to determine value-based prices to guarantee overall market revenues, not revenue for any specific product or company. The poorest countries would not pay a value-based price but a discounted "tail-price." Innovators must agree to supply them at this tail price or to facilitate technology transfer to local licensees at low or zero cost to enable them to supply at this price. We expect these purchases to be paid for in full or large part by global donors. The BBAMC therefore sets prices in relation to value, protects intellectual property rights, encourages competition, and ensures all populations get access to vaccines, subject to agreed priority allocation rules.

Were it business opportunities or hidden risks: Observations on clinical trials and marketing authorizations of Gilead Science's remdesivir in China.

New drugs against the in COVID-19 pandemic are urgently needed. Gilead Science's remdesivir has been introduced to China through special approval procedures, and was directly conducting the Phase III clinical trial. As expected, the marketing authorization process was completed soon. The drug brought hope to patients as well as business opportunities to companies. However, we must pay attention to the patent competition, generic drug competition and other unfair competition that remdesivir may face in China. China also needs to strengthen the innovation ability and international cooperation ability of local pharmaceutical companies by taking advantages of the opportunity to introduce remdesivir.